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Arms Races 
D J Raine, D N Burghes, M S Borrie 
 
We propose a model of an arms race between two nations A and B. The war potential of each 
is measured by the expenditure on arms as a function of time t, xA(t) and xB(t) say. The rate of 
increase of A's armaments will depend on the level B has reached, but also on the A's own 
level, since the cost of expansion has a restraining effect. This restraint we suggest has a 
timescale equal to the lifetime of a national parliament. This cannot be the whole story since 
xA = xB =0 will be a stable equilibrium and no pair of nations would go to war. There are of 
course some instances where this is true: for example, Canada and the US have had 
permanent peace since 1817. This is presumeably because there is no source of grievance 
between them. In general the rate of change of armament spending must contain a grievance 
term. This suggests a system of two states will be in equilibrium if the mutual grievances are 
balanced by the financial constraints. Does this mean the model requires three states to 
initiate war? Can equilibrium hold at any level of spending? It is interesting that spending on 
arms amongst the principal European protagonists prior to 1914 were given by the following 
table. 
 
Year 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
Spending £M 199 205 215 239 289 
 
which shows how spending increased over the period. 
 
